The Nature of Culture: an eight-grade model for the evolution and expansion of cultural capacities in hominins and other animals by Haidle, Miriam et al.
 
 
The Nature of Culture: an eight-grade model for the
evolution and expansion of cultural capacities in
hominins and other animals
Haidle, Miriam ; Bolus, Michael; Collard, Mark; Conard, Nicholas; Garofoli, Duilio; Lombard,
Marlize; Nowell, April; Tennie, Claudio; Whiten, Andrew
DOI:
10.4436/jass.93011
License:
Creative Commons: Attribution-NonCommercial (CC BY-NC)
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Haidle, M, Bolus, M, Collard, M, Conard, N, Garofoli, D, Lombard, M, Nowell, A, Tennie, C & Whiten, A 2015,
'The Nature of Culture: an eight-grade model for the evolution and expansion of cultural capacities in hominins
and other animals', Journal of Anthropological Sciences, vol. 93, pp. 43-70. https://doi.org/10.4436/jass.93011
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
Eligibility for repository checked: 11/08/2015. This work is distributed under the terms of a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial
4.0 Unported License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Feb. 2019
 JASs Invited Reviews
Journal of Anthropological Sciences
Vol. 93 (2015), pp. 43-70
the JASs is published by the Istituto Italiano di Antropologia www.isita-org.com
The Nature of Culture: an eight-grade model for the 
evolution and expansion of cultural capacities in hominins 
and other animals
Miriam Noël Haidle1, 2, Michael Bolus2, Mark Collard3, 4, Nicholas J. Conard5, 
Duilio Garofoli2, 6, Marlize Lombard7, 8, April Nowell9, Claudio Tennie10, 11 & 
Andrew Whiten12
1)Research Center “The Role of Culture in Early Expansions of Humans” of the Heidelberg Academy of 
Sciences and Humanities, Senckenberg Research Institute, Senckenberganlage 25, 60325 Frankfurt, 
Germany
e-mail: miriam.haidle@uni-tuebingen.de, mhaidle@senckenberg.de
2) Research Center “The Role of Culture in Early Expansions of Humans” of the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences 
and Humanities, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Rümelinstr. 23, 72070 Tübingen, Germany
3) Human Evolutionary Studies Program and Department of Archaeology, Simon Fraser University, 8888 
University Drive, Burnaby, British Columbia, V5A 1S6, Canada 
4) Department of Archaeology, University of Aberdeen, St Mary’s Building, Elphinstone Road, Aberdeen, 
AB24 3UF, UK
5) Institut für Ur- und Frühgeschichte und Archäologie des Mittelalters, Abt. Ältere Urgeschichte und 
Quartärökologie, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Schloss, Burgsteige 11, 72070 Tübingen, Germany
6) Zentrum für Naturwissenschaftliche Archäologie, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Rümelinstr. 23, 
72070 Tübingen, Germany
7) Department of Anthropology and Development Studies, University of Johannesburg, PO Box 524, 
Auckland Park Campus, Johannesburg 2006, South Africa
8) Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study (STIAS), Wallenberg Research Centre at Stellenbosch 
University, Stellenbosch 7600, South Africa
9) Department of Anthropology, University of Victoria, P.O. Box 3050, STN CSC, Victoria, BC Canada, 
V8W 3P5
10) School of Psychology, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK
11) Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Deutscher Platz 6, 04103 Leipzig, Germany
12) Centre for Social Learning and Cognitive Evolution, School of Psychology & Neuroscience, University 
of St Andrews, St Andrews, KY16 9JP, UK
Summary - Tracing the evolution of human culture through time is arguably one of the most controversial 
and complex scholarly endeavors, and a broad evolutionary analysis of how symbolic, linguistic, and cultural 
capacities emerged and developed in our species is lacking. Here we present a model that, in broad terms, aims 
to explain the evolution and portray the expansion of human cultural capacities (the EECC model), that 
can be used as a point of departure for further multidisciplinary discussion and more detailed investigation. 
The EECC model is designed to be flexible, and can be refined to accommodate future archaeological, 
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paleoanthropological, genetic or evolutionary psychology/behavioral analyses and discoveries. Our proposed 
concept of cultural behavior differentiates between empirically traceable behavioral performances and 
behavioral capacities that are theoretical constructs. Based largely on archaeological data (the ‘black box’ 
that most directly opens up hominin cultural evolution), and on the extension of observable problem-solution 
distances, we identify eight grades of cultural capacity. Each of these grades is considered within evolutionary-
biological and historical-social trajectories. Importantly, the model does not imply an inevitable progression, 
but focuses on expansion of cultural capacities based on the integration of earlier achievements. We conclude 
that there is not a single cultural capacity or a single set of abilities that enabled human culture; rather, several 
grades of cultural capacity in animals and hominins expanded during our evolution to shape who we are today.
Keywords - Cultural capacity, Cultural performance, Cultural evolution, Animal culture, Human culture.
Introduction
“Culture …, taken in its wide ethnographic 
sense, is that complex whole which includes 
knowledge, belief, art, morals, custom, and any 
other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a 
member of society. The condition of culture among 
the various societies of mankind, in so far as it is 
capable of being investigated on general principles, 
is a subject apt for the study of laws of thought and 
action. On the one hand, the uniformity which so 
largely pervades civilization may be ascribed, in 
great measure, to the uniform action of uniform 
causes; while on the other hand its various grades 
may be regarded as stages of development or 
evolution, each the outcome of previous history, and 
about to do its proper part in shaping the history of 
the future” (Tylor, 1871, p. 1) 
In his 1871 volume on “Primitive culture: 
researches into the development of mythology, 
philosophy, religion, art, and custom” the English 
anthropologist Edward Burnett Tylor laid the 
groundwork of cultural evolutionism. On one 
level, his classic definition of culture is straight-
forward, but on another level, ‘major issues’ are 
already implicit in the passage cited above. At 
the time of his writing, not much was known 
about the course of human evolution. “Man as a 
member of society” referred to modern humans 
(Homo sapiens); earlier hominin species and their 
cultural expressions were not part of the frame 
of reference. “Stages of development or evolu-
tion” were not seen in an extended, chronological 
perspective across different genera; it simply 
referred to the categorization of different ‘mod-
ern’ cultural performances and possible connec-
tions between these groupings. Since then, our 
understanding of humankind, our place in nature 
and the processes of change and continuity has 
changed fundamentally. The concept of evolu-
tion, based on Darwin’s ideas, has been refined 
by genetic research, the concept of an organism 
as a biological system, epigenetic studies, and it 
is applied to fields beyond biology, including cul-
ture and cognitive evolution. Knowledge of hom-
inin species richness has increased considerably, 
as has knowledge of the artifacts used by the fos-
sil hominins. We now have evidence for around 
20 fossil hominin species between 7 Ma and 18 
Ka (MacLatchy et al., 2010), while the origins of 
technology – a widely accepted indicator of cul-
ture – have been traced back to at least 2.6 Ma 
(McPherron et al., 2010; Semaw et al., 2003). 
The concept of ‘culture’ has become a frequently 
used, but controversial notion to describe special 
behavioral phenomena. Still regarded by some as 
a uniquely human attribute, the term ‘culture’ 
has been increasingly applied to a special subset 
of behavioral patterns associated with some ani-
mal groups such as New Caledonian crows (Bluff 
et al., 2010), whales and dolphins (Allen et al., 
2013; Rendell & Whitehead, 2001; Whitehead 
& Rendell, 2015), and great apes including chim-
panzees (Lycett et al., 2007, 2011; Whiten et al., 
1999), orangutans (van Schaik et al., 2003), and 
bonobos (Hohmann & Fruth, 2003) (for critical 
discussion see Laland & Janik, 2006).  
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The definition of the term ‘culture’ is, how-
ever, diverse and debated in its various fields 
of application. Philosophy, social and cultural 
sciences use multiple definitions (Kroeber & 
Kluckhohn, 1952; Hammel, 2007), but gener-
ally consider it to be a trait exclusive to Homo 
sapiens (Ramsey, 2013). Culture has been defined 
as: “behavior, peculiar to the human species, 
acquired by learning, and transmitted from one 
individual, group, or generation to another by 
mechanisms of social inheritance”(White, 1959, 
p. 228), or as “an abstraction from behavior” 
(ibid. p. 227), instead of behavior itself. The term 
may be used in a restrictive way as “things and 
acts dependent on symboling” (ibid. p. 230), or 
as symbolic things and acts “considered and inter-
preted in an extrasomatic context, i.e., in terms of 
their relationships to one another rather than to 
human organisms” (ibid. p. 231). The focus, for 
example, has been on cultural patterning (ibid. 
pp. 232-233), or on culture as a set of ideas (ibid. 
pp. 236-237), including or excluding material 
culture (ibid. pp. 238-239). Other definitions are 
used to trace animal culture and emphasize the 
social transmission of information in the process 
of development of population-level characteris-
tics, in contrast to genetic inheritance (Whiten et 
al., 1999, p. 682). As Richerson & Boyd (2005, 
p. 6) state: “Culture is information stored in indi-
viduals’ brains that is capable of affecting behav-
ior and that got there through social learning.” 
The two approaches are reflected in the cul-
turalistic versus naturalistic views on culture 
in philosophical anthropology (Bloch, 1991; 
Hallpike, 2008; Pihlström, 2003). Culturalism 
emphasizes humans (generally Homo sapiens) as 
intentionally and purposefully acting cultural 
beings, and cultural achievements as meaning-
ful and self-determined. Humans are seen to 
live, not only in a physical world, but also in a 
symbolical world formed by language and other 
symbolic expressions. Culture, which shapes 
human life, is “continuously reconstitut[ed] 
through our social action and linguistic encoun-
ter with our symbolic world” (Pihlström, 2003, 
p. 263). In contrast, naturalism explains cultural 
achievements, like other natural phenomena, by 
natural forces and laws. Thus, animals can also 
be thought of as bearers of culture, with the 
development of culture being driven by evo-
lution (Laland & Galef, 2009; Whiten et al., 
2011). Both of these positions have problems. 
The culturalistic approach lacks a broad evolu-
tionary perspective of how symbolic, linguistic, 
and cultural capacities emerge, while the natu-
ralistic one falls short when it comes to deal-
ing with certain specificities of cultural expres-
sions, transformations, and processes, especially 
in explaining the active component of human 
culture (Perry, 2009; Hill, 2009). Both the cul-
turalist and naturalist approaches refer to living 
organisms and their directly observable behavior. 
Paleolithic archaeology and paleoanthropology, 
however, are not only interested in a given state 
of expression of cultural behavior at any specific 
time. Rather, these fields also examine the long-
term development of culture within evolution-
ary and processual contexts. Research on these 
aspects of culture is complicated by the fragmen-
tary record of past behaviors resulting from par-
tial materialization, incomplete embedding and 
preservation over thousands of years, fractional 
discovery, poor dating resolution and hence lim-
ited possibilities of analysis and interpretation. 
Several attempts have been made in the last 
decade to approach the concept of culture from 
a more integrative point of view. These attempts 
aim to understand “culture across species” (Byrne 
et al., 2004) and “the evolution of cultural evolu-
tion” (Henrich & McElreath, 2003), to explore 
“the evolution of animal culture” (Whiten & 
van Schaik, 2007) and the association of cog-
nitive and cultural evolution (Haidle, 2008), 
to look for “a unified science of cultural evolu-
tion” (Mesoudi et al., 2006), and to gain insight 
into how “culture evolves” (Whiten et al., 2012). 
These authors discuss evolutionary aspects of cul-
ture defined in varying ways, providing insight 
into mechanisms of cultural development and 
their evolution (see also Andersson et al., 2014; 
El Mouden et al., 2014), supported by a grow-
ing corpus of empirical studies. However, they 
also reveal that two major elements required for 
synthesis are lacking:
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1) A concept of culture and of cultural evolu-
tion that covers not one single idea of cul-
ture, but discriminates different specificities 
of culture among, as well as within species. 
Such a concept should include several types 
of mechanisms that determine cultural pe-
culiarities.
2) A model of cultural evolution that incorpo-
rates grades of pre-cultural, proto-cultural 
and cultural behavior identified in animals 
and the major cultural changes known in 
human evolution. 
In the present paper, we—a multidisciplinary 
group of archaeologists, biological anthropolo-
gists, sociocultural anthropologists, primatolo-
gists, and psychologists—attempt to fill these gaps 
by developing a new conceptual model for the 
analysis of culture and cultural evolution. The 
core components of the model were developed at 
a symposium that was organized by “The Role of 
Culture in Early Expansions of Humans” research 
center of the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences and 
Humanities in 2011 (Haidle & Conard, 2011).
An integrative concept of cultural 
behavior and evolution
The proposed integrative concept of cultural 
behavior and evolution differentiates between 
empirically traceable behavioral performances and 
behavioral capacities, as theoretical constructs. 
Cultural Performances
Cultural performances are a subset of the 
behavioral performances of an individual, group, 
or population. Cultural performances can be 
observed in a variety of behavioral fields, such as 
Fig. 1 - Cultural performance with three dimensions of development (evolutionary-biological, his-
torical-social, and ontogenetic-individual) and their main mechanisms of development. The cultural 
performance of a group is interdependent with the group-specific environment. This includes con-
specifics, agents and objects as affecting or affected elements with specific relationships to the 
group and in a certain time depth of perception, conception and action. 
www.isita-org.com
47M.N. Haidle et al.
nutrition and food acquisition, communication, 
social organization, settlement patterns, and they 
can manifest in material products. Cultural perfor-
mances possess three dimensions of development, 
i.e.: evolutionary-biological, historical-social, and 
ontogenetic-individual (Fig.1). Cultural perfor-
mances, per definition, require a historical-social 
dimension of development, while other non-cul-
tural behavioral performances do not. Cultural 
performances represent the actual set of attributes 
with historical-social and developmental aspects, 
including activities and manners and their mate-
rial or notional manifestations. Cultural perfor-
mances (transmitted by social learning) can be 
observed in living organisms as well as partly (due 
to preservation and interpretation constraints) 
through archaeological assemblages.
The evolutionary-biological dimension affects 
the biological potential and constraints for a cul-
tural performance set in genes and gene expres-
sions, and expressed in anatomical blueprints and 
physiological standards of a group of organisms. 
Developments in this dimension enable or ham-
per a performance, either by directly affecting its 
emergence (as the activation of a specific gene or 
set of genes influences the expression of a certain 
trait), or by indirectly constraining developmental 
possibilities – for example, via the range of possi-
bilities for a behavior given by the structure of the 
nervous system and the brain, sensory perception, 
principle motor and articulation skills, the mem-
ory system, the form of sociality, and the abili-
ties to communicate, plan, and reason. The evo-
lutionary-biological dimension affects the basic 
course of life history, the physiological-cognitive 
potential to perceive, create, learn and remember 
cultural traits, and the ways in which they can be 
expressed. For example, with flippers and flukes 
(instead of hands and feet), with a sound produc-
tion system within the blow hole, with a differ-
ent brain structure (despite external similarities 
such as a remarkable size and extensive folding of 
the neocortex; see Marino et al., 2007), and with 
different social structures and life histories, a dol-
phin (Norris, 1966) possesses markedly different 
biological equipment for cultural behavior com-
pared to that of a chimpanzee or a human. The 
species-specific characteristic of the evolutionary-
biological dimension of behavioral performances 
enables the finding of species-specific solutions to 
species-specific problems. Continuity or change 
in this dimension underlies evolutionary mecha-
nisms such as gene replication, mutation and var-
iation in selection. However, although material 
engagement with the environment and, as part of 
it, material culture cannot change the deep prop-
erties of a neural network, it can change the pro-
cess of functional specialization, which is related 
to a historical/social and ontogenetic dimension 
(Coward & Grove, 2012; Fisher & Ridley, 2013; 
Jäncke, 2009; Malafouris, 2010, 2013; Woollett 
& Maguire, 2011).  
The ontogenetic-individual dimension refers to 
individual agency and pertains to the potential 
and constraints of an individual organism, set by 
an individual’s talents or poor aptitudes, social 
setting and life histories of physical, mental, and 
emotional experiences. The ontogenetic-individ-
ual dimension is reflected in individuals’ range of 
preferences, aversions, skills and abilities. Already 
in the womb, monozygotic twins, with the same 
genetic complement, have different experiences 
with different epigenetic effects (Petanjek & 
Kostović, 2012). Siblings can be raised in the 
same family, within the same historical-social 
setting, but experience different influences by 
parents, relatives, friends, teachers, etc., by sup-
port or deprivation, by diseases, fortuitous tim-
ing or traumatic accidents. All these factors affect 
the mechanisms of change that operate on this 
dimension: individual learning, personal inven-
tions, and epigenetics, “factors that influence 
gene expression without modifying the DNA 
sequence” (Ledón-Rettig et al., 2013, p. 311). 
Behavioral performances may express solely 
a biological program like reflexes (although these 
may also be influenced by individual factors such 
as disorders of the nervous system). They may also 
combine genetically inherited factors with individ-
ual aspects, such as nest building behavior of birds, 
squirrels and beavers. In these cases, the behavioral 
program may be largely instinctively initiated, but 
the execution is improved and adjusted to the spe-
cific situation by individual learning.
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Cultural performances, in contrast, involve 
historical-social dimension that represents histori-
cal and social cues opening potential scenarios 
or raising constraints. The set of historically 
acquired knowledge and skills, customs, views 
and opinions represents a basis of behavior 
derived from experiences made by group mem-
bers. For example, the organism can use the per-
formance of expert group members as a scaffold 
for learning behavioral tasks. In this way, he can 
reduce costs of acquisition and risks of failure. 
The social access to the cultural set affects the 
possibilities of an individual to benefit from the 
experiences made by other members of a group. 
The forms and extent of storage, transmission, 
permutation, and transformation of the histor-
ical-social set support or hamper the unfolding 
of cultural performances. Cultural behavior is 
grounded on factors developed by evolutionary-
biological processes and it is learned and executed 
in individual ways. A learning path is, however, 
also provided by the behavior of the social group 
to which an individual belongs. This social learn-
ing path is created and functions within a histori-
cal time frame (cf. Sterelny, 2012). 
The historical-social dimension, in general, 
affects the ways in which the evolutionary-
biological basics are used for cultural behavior, 
but it can also affect the plasticity of some bio-
logical bases developed in phylogeny (Coward 
& Grove, 2012; Fisher & Ridley, 2013; Jäncke, 
2009; Kim & Sasaki, 2014; Malafouris, 2010, 
2013; Woollett & Maguire, 2011). This dimen-
sion unfolds via social transmission, from stimu-
lus enhancement to the capacity of teaching, 
via group-wide adoption of innovations and via 
transgenerational traditions. The characteristics 
of the historical-social dimension are influenced 
by factors that themselves are under the impact 
of historical-social variables like population den-
sity, communication systems, child-raising hab-
its, teaching systems, and systems of religious 
and political participation. This means that the 
historical-social dimension is self-enhancing; cul-
tural behavior influences factors that foster cul-
tural transmission and creativity (Enquist et al., 
2008). An example that illustrates the importance 
of the historical-social dimension is provided by 
the culturally different forms of color perception 
in humans. This is biologically generally limited 
by trichromatic vision. The ways in which colors 
are seen and categorized, however, are culturally 
influenced by historical-social factors and can 
range from bipartite concepts that differentiate 
only between black and white, to concepts with 
eight and more categories for different shades of 
colors (Hill & Hill, 1979; Kay et al., 1991). How 
an individual perceives the color of an object 
depends on the phylogenetic prerequisites, the 
historical-social system of color categorization in 
which he/she was raised, and the individual affec-
tion to and training of applying it.  
Musical performances provide another exam-
ple. Musicality, the capability for musical percep-
tion and expression, is a biological potential devel-
oped in phylogeny (Peretz, 2006). Historical-
social aspects influence the different ways music is 
perceived and expressed in different social groups 
of humans (Cross, 2001). While general musical-
ity is allowed by biological factors, the preference 
for classical music with baroque instrumentation, 
for rock music with electric bass, or for Indian sitar 
music is biased by historical-social aspects. The 
individual performance in playing one of these 
instruments depends on individual training and 
verve. Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart was an indi-
vidual genius who received special support from 
his musician father. He possessed human capaci-
ties of musicality, not those of a blackbird. And he 
lived in the historical-social context of Austria in 
the 18th century with large orchestras and a broad, 
fascinated audience, which was favorable for his 
special efforts, and not in a small mobile foraging 
group in the mammoth steppe of the last ice age. 
 All of these three major dimensions 
are multi-factorial. The axes in the diagram 
(Fig. 1) do not represent a quantitative measure, 
but qualitative factors opening potentials for 
behavior. Each of these factors has its individual 
developmental path, that is affected by factors of 
the same and the other developmental dimen-
sions of the same and other performances of the 
organism, the group, or elements of the environ-
ment. The three dimensions and their factors are 
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conceptually distinguishable but not independ-
ent in their effects. To the contrary, they interact 
with one another directly or indirectly via recip-
rocal effects in the context of a specific functional 
environment (cf. Andersson et al., 2014; Brooke 
& Larsen, 2014). The specific functional envi-
ronment (or resource space, ecological niche) is 
the sum of the cultural and social aspects of the 
environment of an organism or a group, plus 
the section of the natural environment which 
affects, or is affected by, the organism or the 
group (Haidle, 2008a). The specific functional 
environment (resource space, ecological niche) 
is composed of other performances of the same 
organism as well as of performances of conspecif-
ics (e.g. other Neandertals), of agents (e.g. cave 
bear, anatomically modern humans, a parasite) 
affecting, and of objects (e.g. tree, deer, water, 
chert, scraper) affected by the individual organ-
ism and its performances. These components are 
in specific functional relationships with the indi-
vidual performance or the organism (as predator, 
competitor, shelter, food resource, raw-material 
for tools, tools etc.), which are effective within 
a certain time depth in perception, conception, 
and action (ranging between an instant and gen-
erations in both past and future directions, being 
singular or recurring). The functional relation-
ships of a group of organisms with elements of 
the specific environment (resource space, ecolog-
ical niche) vary according to the affordances the 
organisms perceive in the environment, given the 
state of their evolutionary-biological, historical-
social and ontogenetic-individual dimensions. 
Although the natural landscape of a lion and 
Homo ergaster may have been the same, their spe-
cific environments differed markedly. 
The specific functional environment (resource 
space, or ecological niche) is also not static, but a 
set of other developing entities with several devel-
opmental dimensions. It depends on variation in 
biogeographic distribution of the group or spe-
cies in focus; on geological and climatic changes 
and consequences in vegetation, fauna, and land-
scape on different scales; on the evolution and 
changing performances of other organisms. The 
specific environment shapes an organism and its 
behavior. Some aspects are pleasant, raise well-
being and fitness, others are uncomfortable or 
even lethal. Thus, some environmental factors are 
sought after, whereas  others should be avoided or 
altered. And an organism, respective of its behav-
ior, can also shape the environment by changing 
the frequency of vegetation and fauna elements, 
eating other organisms, spreading seeds with 
excrement, suppressing competitors, opening 
landscapes, providing nutrition, etc., thus con-
structing its specific niche respectively (Kendal et 
al., 2011; Laland & Sterelny, 2006; Odling-Smee 
et al., 1996, 2013; Scott-Phillips et al., 2014), by 
effects of factors of the historical-social dimen-
sion, the cultural niche (Laland & O’Brien 2011). 
On the one hand, the specific functional 
environment (resource space, ecological niche) 
is the sphere where evolutionary-biological adap-
tations are brought forward. On the other, it 
is also effective as the learning environment of 
an organism, in the ontogenetic-individual as 
well as in the historical-social dimension. Via 
individual and social learning the behavior can 
be rapidly adjusted to a specific, heterogeneous 
and changing environment, and behavior is con-
stantly forming the future adaptive and learning 
environment. In human evolution, not only do 
the three developmental dimensions of behavior 
expand, but consequently, the specific environ-
ments of hominins (that serve as basis) become 
increasingly altered and/or enriched.  Figure 1 
can provide only a broad outline of the differ-
ent developmental lines of cultural performance 
– neither a mere biological product, nor solely a 
historical issue – and their embedding into the 
specific functional environment in which the 
lives of individuals play out.
Cultural capacities
While cultural performances represent the 
actual sets of cultural attributes expressed by an 
organism or a group (subunit), cultural capacities 
of a defined analytical unit (species, population, or 
group) are theoretical constructs and express the 
potential range of cultural performances in differ-
ent subunits at a given time. The different perfor-
mances are based on different factors of the three 
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developmental dimensions and different segments 
of the specific functional environment; the sum of 
the performances expresses the sum of factors of 
the three developmental dimensions, documented 
in an analytical unit, and of the overall specific 
functional environment.  The cultural capacity 
of, say, Homo heidelbergensis cannot be directly 
observed. It must be deduced from the sum of 
quasi-contemporaneous performances observed 
through the record of material culture preserved 
at different archaeological sites associated with 
Homo heidelbergensis (Fig. 2). The same principle 
applies to the assessment of cultural capacities of 
a specifically defined group: the cultural capac-
ity of social groups (e.g., along linguistic lines) is 
derived from the sum of the possibly different sets 
of performances of the subgroups at different sites, 
within variable biogeographic areas with diverse 
ecological factors operating. ‘Capacity’ in the 
sense of this paper refers to the maximum range of 
the evolutionary-biological, historical-social, and 
ontological-individual dimensions, and the spe-
cific functional environment as expressed in the 
varying performances of the subgroups of the unit 
under examination. ‘Capacity’ is thus dependent 
on the layout of the unit to be analyzed. The cul-
tural capacity of an analytical unit (group, popu-
lation, or species) is never completely exhausted 
by each of the particular subunits (individuals, 
groups, or populations); rather, different aspects 
of the capacity are used and expressed. The cul-
tural capacity of an analytical unit represents the 
potential of behavior given by the sum of factors 
developed in the phylogenetic, historical-social, 
and ontogenetic-individual dimensions, in inter-
action with a specific functional environment 
(resource space, ecological niche). 
The range of cultural performances of dif-
ferent groups – and thus the corresponding 
cultural capacities – has expanded over the 
Fig. 2 - Contemporaneous cultural performances of different subunits (1, 2, 3, and 4) of an analytical 
unit (e.g. species X) with different expression within the three dimensions. The maximal outline of 
all the observed performances forms the cultural capacity of the analytical unit X. The axes in the 
diagram do not represent a specific quantitative measure, but qualitative potentials for behavior 
developed in evolutionary-biological, historical-social and ontogenetic-individual dimensions.
www.isita-org.com
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course of human evolution. Nonetheless, a sin-
gle cultural performance in an advanced grade 
of cultural capacity may be simpler in its devel-
opmental dimensions and interaction with the 
specific environment than another performance 
in an earlier grade, since different aspects of the 
full cultural potential can be applied selectively 
(Lombard & Parsons, 2011). The mechanisms 
of cultural development can be compared with 
the act of mountaineering (Lombard, 2012); 
it is always possible to proceed from any point 
reached so far, increasing behavioral or cultural 
complexity and flexibility, but it is also possible 
for individuals or groups to re-exploit seemingly 
simpler options, depending on the ruggedness 
of the specific fitness landscape (socio-ecological 
niche). Using the mountaineering metaphor, 
cumulative cultural capacity does not only 
include those cultural efforts that are built upon 
the highest level achieved, but also recursions fol-
lowing on seemingly more advanced solutions. 
Advanced cultural capacities are not necessarily 
accompanied by a progressive line of ever-more 
sophisticated and complex performances built on 
earlier ones, but allow increasing technological, 
cognitive, and behavioral flexibility from very 
simple to highly complex solutions depending on 
changing environmental constraints and cultural 
decisions (Lombard & Parsons, 2011; Lombard, 
2012 in press). Thus, although the range of cul-
tural performances expands with increasing cul-
tural capacity, cultural evolution is not always 
linearly progressive. The development of cultural 
capacity is a systemic process involving the co-
evolution of the three dimensions outlined above 
and their interaction with the specific functional 
environment (resource space, ecological niche). 
We stress that we perceive the evolution of cul-
tural capacity as a continuous and ongoing pro-
cess, yet we define eight main grades in the pro-
cess of cultural expansion, the first four of which 
can also be found in several animal species. 
A model of cultural evolution
A model of cultural evolution has to explore 
and explain the course of changes in cultural 
capacities. Multiple factors that affect the 
development of individual and social aspects of 
cultural behavior can be identified, including 
learning and social transmission of information 
(Csibra & Gergely, 2011), memory (Bjorklund 
& Sellers, 2014), group conformity (Claidière 
et al., 2014; van Leeuwen & Haun, 2014), and 
cooperation (Tomasello et al., 2012). Each of 
these and other factors are important, but it is 
difficult to link them to a historical sequence. We 
attempt here to give a framework for the expan-
sion of cultural capacities, based on the exten-
sions of types of socially transmitted information. 
This model can be used as a scaffold to attach 
and combine the different factors in the course 
of cultural development and human evolution. 
Tracing the evolution and expansion of cultural 
capacities
The available data sets are a challenge for 
efforts to build a model of the evolution of cul-
tural capacity that integrates the different lev-
els of pre-cultural, proto-cultural and cultural 
behavior, as identified in extant animals and 
cultural expansions in human evolution. Thus 
far, attempts have been based on ethological data 
(Tennie et al., 2009; Tomasello, 1999; Whiten & 
van Schaik, 2007), focusing on the mechanisms 
of the social transmission of information. While 
Whiten and van Schaik (2007) concentrated on 
the evolution of animal culture with minor refer-
ence to hominin development, Tomasello (1999) 
and Tennie et al. (2009) compared mechanisms 
of cooperation and learning in chimpanzees and 
modern humans to describe the unique character 
of human cumulative culture – process-oriented 
copying in the human case, versus product-ori-
ented copying in chimpanzees. In humans this 
process is aided by cooperation-based factors – 
active teaching, social motivation for conformity, 
and normative sanctions against non-conform-
ity. Together, these result in an accumulation 
of cultural traits over time, the so-called ratchet 
effect. However, the developmental aspect of the 
evolutionary process in hominins, from the non-
human foundations to current human cultural 
behavior is lacking in both approaches, due to 
limitations of the included data. Whilst useful 
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to begin to differentiate animal from modern 
human (Homo sapiens) cultural behavior, these 
ethologically-based approaches cannot detect 
possible preceding or successive capacities under-
lying cultural evolution. 
We argue that tracing such wider develop-
ments must be based on the data which most 
directly open up the black box of hominin cul-
tural evolution – the archaeological record. This 
provides the only evidence, although fragmented 
and indirect (cf. Haidle, 2014), of past hominin 
behavior. The questions that can be posed based 
on artifacts and fossils go beyond those derived 
from ethological data. Aspects of the cognitive 
background, the mechanisms of social transmis-
sion of information and the population level pat-
terning of cultural behavior can only be partially 
inferred from archaeological finds. The type of 
socially transmitted information, however, could 
be accessible in prehistoric as well as in modern 
material remains, but is often neglected. 
As an integrative structure for a systematic 
comparability of different archaeological remains 
and ethological data, we characterize the type of 
socially transmitted information by analyzing 
the ‘problem-solution distance’. The problem-
solution distance (PSD) represents the behavioral 
route from perceiving a problem or need to its 
solution or satisfaction including possible loops 
or sidetracks. The PSD was first mentioned in 
Wolfgang Köhler’s (1926) comparative studies 
of chimpanzee behavior, where an extended PSD 
was suggested to be identifiable in tool behavior. 
In tool use, a goal is not approached directly (as 
when a hungry zebra starts to eat grass), but by 
moving away from the target object (e.g., a nut) 
to reach satisfaction (feeding) via an intercalated 
tool (e.g., a hammer). Haidle extended the con-
cept of PSD and developed a model to systemati-
cally assess levels of complexity by coding them 
in cognigrams (Haidle, 2012, 2014; Lombard & 
Haidle, 2012). Using this method, PSDs of tool 
behaviors in living animals, ancient hominins, and 
recent humans can be compared directly (Haidle, 
2009, 2010, 2012; Haidle & Bräuer, 2011; 
Hodgskiss, 2014; Hunt et al., 2013). Differences 
can be found in the number of active and passive 
attention foci necessary to solve a problem, and 
in the number of actions taken to satisfy a need. 
However, most significant for an evolutionary 
analysis of types of socially transmitted informa-
tion and the expansion of cultural capacities are 
the different effective concepts through which 
attention foci are linked to each other. 
Individual tool behaviors, and the PSD 
underlying them, comprise the tool-behavior 
performances of organisms and groups, which 
are part of their behavioral performances as a 
whole. The manufacture and use of tools of fossil 
hominins can be construed from the fragmentary 
material remains of the performances preserved 
in the archaeological record (cf. Haidle, 2014). 
Based on these data, we can deduce superordinate 
cultural capacities, defined by types of socially 
transmitted information, from the range of tool-
behavior performances represented in ethologi-
cal and archaeological assemblages. Rather than 
focusing narrowly on a particular artifact and the 
possibility of its invention by a single individual, 
our approach, similar to that of Whiten and col-
leagues (1999), aims to consider the entire acces-
sible cultural repertoire of a group. In contrast 
to systematic differentiations of modes in stone 
technology (Clarke, 1969; Shea, 2013), PSD 
underlies all artefact types and technologies, and 
it shows a necessary developmental sequence. 
Additionally, an extended PSD is not exclusive 
to tool behavior, but is inherent also in social 
behavior and in the fulfilment of tasks needing 
self-control (MacLean et al., 2014). Thus, the 
problem-solution capacities identified in tool 
behavior represent a minimum cultural capacity 
available to perform different types of cultural 
behavior. Assessing or reconstructing the differ-
ent effective concepts, arising through the analy-
sis of PSD in tool behavior, is one possibility to 
create a model of expansions of cultural capaci-
ties. The approach taken here is not a quantita-
tive one, but distinguishes qualitative extensions 
of behavioral options. It provides the possibility 
to integrate animal, fossil hominin and modern 
human data within a unitary evolutionary model 
and the possibility to link different developmental 
factors to this scaffold. The empirical validation 
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and respectively falsification of this model will be 
subsequently given by developmental evidence 
of factors connected to cultural evolution sup-
porting, contradicting, or altering the integrative 
model presented in the following. 
A model for the evolution and expansion of 
cultural capacities (the EECC-model)
Changes in biological, historical-social and/
or individual factors do not produce ‘culture’ in 
a single creative event. If chimpanzees possess a 
capacity for culture, it does not imply that theirs 
exists in the same form as ours. Rather, a range 
of factors generate different cultural capacities 
with specific requirements and possibilities of 
expression. The concept of different and devel-
oping “cultural capacities” is more appropriate 
for studying the evolution in cultural behavior 
than simply assessing the presence or absence of 
“culture” in certain living and extinct species. We 
offer a differentiated analysis of cultural evolu-
tion based on socially transmitted information, 
as observed in animals, such as other primates, 
in comparison with cultural remains from homi-
nins. We also focus on the conditions associated 
with different grades of culture.
Our model for the evolution and expan-
sion of cultural capacities (EECC model) com-
prises eight grades (Fig. 3). The model does not 
imply a progressive ladder, the climbing of which 
leaves the lower steps behind (cf. Lombard 2012; 
in press), but focuses on expansion of cultural 
capacities that extends the behavioral options and 
repertoire while retaining the possibilities of ear-
lier states. To streamline our exposition, we pre-
sent and discuss only the evolutionary-biological 
and historical-social dimensions (c.f. Figs. 1 and 
2), placing the individual dimension on hold. 
Initially, the biological dimension dominates the 
development of cultural capacities, while the role 
of the historical-social dimension is minimal. In 
the course of expansion of cultural capacities, 
there was a marked increase in the biological 
dimension. An even larger, non-linear increase is 
suggested in the historical-social dimension, expo-
nential through developmental self-enhancement 
and the interdependencies with alterations of the 
specific functional environment induced by cul-
tural behavior. The historical-social dimension 
dominates the development of cultural capacity 
in current human societies.  
The first four grades can be observed in some 
extant animal species and partially correspond to 
Whiten and van Schaik’s (2007) ‘pyramid’ model 
of cultural evolution. The focus in the EECC 
model, however, is changed from mechanisms of 
social transmission of information and popula-
tion-level patterning, as in Whiten & van Schaik 
(2007), to the type of information that is socially 
transmitted. As foundational capacities even 
simpler than socially learned information, more 
basic types of social information are proposed. 
Further grades of socially learned information 
(in Whiten & van Schaik [2007] the process of 
social learning) and tradition are derived from 
the Whiten-van Schaik pyramid model, but 
adjusted to the EECC model. For example, we 
extend the original “culture” step of the pyramid 
model, beginning with a grade labeled “basic 
culture”. Then, based on conceptual differences 
in the PSD represented in material culture (see 
above), four grades are distinguished based on 
the prehistoric record. These grades replace the 
single extension towards “cumulative culture” 
as presented in the Whiten-van Schaik model. 
Our newly suggested expressions include modu-
lar, composite, complementary, and notional 
cultural capacities. Below we discuss the eight 
grades of expansion within our proposed model.
1 – Socially facilitated information capacity. 
Animals of many social species, both vertebrate 
and invertebrate, are attracted to the vicinity of 
others based on cues correlated with success-
ful exploitation of resources, such as foraging 
patches (Giraldeau, 2008). Such attraction does 
not necessarily require learning; instead it may 
merely constitute a basic capacity to respond to a 
set of social cues. However, it can result in homo-
geneity of behavior between the individual and 
others in the group. Since such homogeneity is 
the result of social influence, rather than genetic 
inheritance or direct environmental shaping, it 
represents the most basic biological foundation 
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to culture. Thus, socially-derived homogeneity 
is arguably the most fundamental characteristic 
of ‘culture’. Examples other than joining forag-
ing groupings include attraction to nest sites in 
colonially nesting birds (‘habitat copying’), and 
to the mate choices of others (‘mate choice copy-
ing’). These phenomena are often referred to 
as ‘public information use’ or the exploitation 
of ‘inadvertent social information’ (Danchin, 
2008). Decision-making may extend beyond 
basic attraction to capacities like discrimination 
and preferences for such additional cues such as 
the rate of observed foraging success (Giraldeau, 
2008). Of course, since an ability to learn might 
be evident in the species concerned, individual-
level learning may follow the initial attraction. 
For example, birds attracted to a foraging patch 
may learn its characteristics and return to it later. 
However, the basic attraction process need not 
involve learning, and many examples may be 
short lived. Such attraction can, however, give 
rise to long-term, and even trans-generational 
effects. For example, when birds are attracted 
to certain breeding colonies, and their offspring 
express the same preference, whether the cross-
generation stability of the breeding colony could 
Fig.  3 - The expansion of cultural capacity in eight grades. The basic four grades (‘social informa-
tion’ to ‘basic’) have been documented in some animal species, while the subsequent four (‘modular’ 
to ‘notional’) have, thus far, only been identified in the course of human evolution. With expanding 
cultural capacities the prominence of the historical-social dimension increases relative to the bio-
logical dimension. The colour version of this figure is available at the JASs website.
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be considered a tradition becomes a moot ques-
tion, even if not dependent on social learning. 
Most definitions of traditions and culture (see 
below) require social learning as a key criterion.  
2 – Socially learned information capacity. When 
the acquisition of information via others has 
durable effects in an animal’s memory systems, 
a capacity for social learning is apparent. For 
example, an animal witnessing another’s suc-
cessful foraging may learn things that shape its 
future behavior. Exactly what is learned covers 
an extensive range, from the mere location or 
items involved (local and stimulus enhancement, 
respectively) to imitation (copying the form of 
actions in others) and emulation (learning about 
significant results of others’ actions). The many 
different forms and processes involved in ani-
mal social learning have been dissected, both 
theoretically and empirically, over the last few 
decades (Hoppitt & Laland, 2008; Whiten & 
Ham, 1992; Whiten et al., 2004). Social learn-
ing can generate faster and safer adaptive behav-
ioral modifications than either individual learn-
ing or selection on underlying genetics. Recent 
work has even begun to address the rules animals 
apply for when to favor social over individual 
learning, and under what circumstances dif-
ferent cues and kinds of learning are preferred 
(Laland, 2004). For example, male vervet mon-
keys migrating to new groups have been found to 
readily abandon their natal food preferences for 
different ones expressed in the groups they join 
– a potent effect of social learning (van de Waal 
et al., 2013). However, much of what is learned 
from others may be relatively transient. It may be 
useful for a chimpanzee to learn from observing 
others what is a good fruiting tree to visit, but 
this may be relevant for only a few days. Only 
when the effects are much more durable do we 
see progression towards the next grade of cultural 
capacity – the creation of behavioral traditions. 
3 – Tradition capacity. Traditions are created 
when behavioral entities are transmitted through 
repeated social learning by individuals to 
become durable characteristics of an identifiable 
grouping of individuals. A capacity to sustain 
such traditions has been identified in a diver-
sity of vertebrate taxa, including fish, birds, pri-
mates and other mammals (Galef, 2004; Whiten 
et al., 2012). The type of socially transmitted 
information, culminating in traditions, depends 
on the kind of social learning involved, includ-
ing mechanisms as imitation and emulation. 
For example, the transmission of birdsong dia-
lects involves copying of the form of the songs 
themselves, rather than their results, whereas the 
transmission of tool use in chimpanzees, such 
as used in nut-cracking, appears to be focused 
more on emulative learning of the results of such 
actions (Biro et al., 2006; Tennie et al., 2009). 
Similar to other forms of social information, tra-
ditions may be transmitted vertically, from par-
ent to offspring, or (unlike genetic inheritance) 
horizontally between peers, or diagonally from 
older individuals other than parents. Horizontal 
transmission has been rigorously identified in 
‘diffusion experiments’, in which alternative 
foraging techniques have been seeded in dif-
ferent groups of birds and mammals, within 
which they were later shown to spread (Whiten 
& Mesoudi, 2008). Recent studies in chimpan-
zees show that group-specific traditions could be 
observed over 25 years. The immigrating females 
adapted their original behavior to the form com-
monly used in the incorporating group (Luncz & 
Boesch, 2014). This evidence suggests that group 
conformity is not only a main trigger to adopt 
innovations as has been documented in experi-
mental studies with birds (Aplin et al., 2015). 
Moreover, information about group conformity 
may become an independent socially transmitted 
feature in addition to the information about the 
manner in which a problem can be solved (see 
also Haun et al., 2014; van de Waal et al., 2013; 
van Leeuwen & Haun, 2014).
4 – Basic cultural capacity. Many writers in the 
biological sciences treat the terms ‘tradition’ 
and ‘culture’ essentially as synonyms. For oth-
ers, however, the latter term requires additional 
criteria, such as modes of social transmission 
that are assumed to be particularly critical in 
56 Nature of Culture
human culture, notably imitation and teaching 
(Galef, 1992); or the appreciation of prescrip-
tive social norms, about how one ‘should’ behave 
in one’s local culture (Perry, 2009). A criterion 
proposed by Whiten and van Schaik (2007) is 
that ‘cultures’ be recognized as constituted by 
multiple traditions that incorporate a diversity 
of behavioral forms. This criterion is evidenced 
most richly among non-human species in great 
apes such as chimpanzees and orangutans, where 
variations extend to scores of behaviors span-
ning food processing, tool use, and aspects of 
social and sexual behavior. An important infer-
ence from the existence of these diverse and 
multiple-tradition cultures in the living great 
apes, including humans, is that our common 
ancestor of approximately 14-million years ago 
would have displayed such characteristics as stem 
cultural phenomena, as would their immediate 
hominin descendants (Whiten, 2011). However, 
there is also evidence of significant, if less rich, 
multiple-tradition cultures in other primates, 
including capuchins and macaques (Whiten, 
2012), and through evolutionary convergence 
in cetaceans such as dolphins and humpback 
whales (Allen et al., 2013; Rendell & Whitehead, 
2001; Whitehead & Rendell, 2015). A special 
feature of basic cultural capacity documented in 
chimpanzees and humans, but not orangutans, 
are nested structures in cultural assemblages “if 
cultures with a small repertoire of traits tend to 
comprise a proper subset of those traits present 
in more complex cultures. This nesting will occur 
if some traits are sequentially gained or lost” 
(Kamilar & Atkinson, 2014, p. 111).
Possible expressions of traditions and basic 
cultural capacities are behavioral performances 
using tools. In contrast to direct behavior between 
subject and object, each tool-use event represents 
an extension of the PSD: instead of approach-
ing a goal directly, at this level of tool behavior, 
attention has to be switched from the main goal 
(e.g., a nut) to a means to reach the goal (e.g., 
a hammerstone). The basic form of tool behav-
ior has been documented in a variety of animal 
species (Haidle, 2012).  Chimpanzees show an 
additional extension of the problem-solution 
distance by using sets of different primary tools 
employed in sequence to a common end, such 
as an initial tool to excavate followed by a finer 
tool to probe within, to gather ants (Sanz et al., 
2009), to extract termites (Sanz et al., 2004), or 
to collect honey (Boesch et al., 2009; Brewer & 
McGrew, 1990; Sanz & Morgan, 2009). Even 
though tool use and production is well known in 
different animal species in the context of tradi-
tions and basic cultural capacity, it is limited to 
the ability to use unmodified objects or objects 
only altered by the animal`s own bodily facilities 
(as distinct from using a tool to modify a tool). 
In these grades the tools are generally bound to a 
result-specific context.
The principal limitation in capacity, implied 
by these most complex forms of culture in non-
humans, lies in the absence of all but the most 
limited signs of cumulative culture, in which 
yet more complex forms are built on what 
went before. Chimpanzees may have accumu-
lated many different traditions over time, but 
with a few possible, minimal exceptions, these 
‘traditions’ do not appear to go beyond what 
was likely the original innovation (Tennie et 
al., 2009). Marked conservatism displayed in 
their cultural repertoires (Gruber et al., 2011; 
Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008) might be a 
possible reason for this limitation, but the degree 
of the behavioral conservatism of chimpanzees is 
debated (Manrique et al., 2012). Chimpanzees 
apply many different tools for many different 
purposes, but their tool behavior is deconstruc-
tive, for example, removing the leaves on a stem 
to be used for fishing. Thus far, they have not 
shown key aspects of ‘cumulative culture’ such 
as making and using one tool to shape a second 
tool or of constructive tool manufacture as rep-
resented in the hominin record. We encounter 
these aspects in the next expression of cultural 
capacity where modular and composite technol-
ogies are evidenced in the archaeological record.
5 – Modular cultural capacity.  This capacity is 
characterized by the development and use of a set 
of independent cultural units which can be used 
as behavioral modules, combined in different 
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ways and put in an effective sequence by acting 
on and modifying each other. The socially trans-
mitted information extends to behavioral units 
that are not exclusively bound to specific and 
acute problems. Instead, the elements of behav-
ioral units (stimulus, concept of solution, goal) 
are increasingly abstracted and thus become 
applicable in different contexts. Traces of modu-
lar cultural capacity can be found in early hom-
inin stone tool production (see below), the cog-
nitive and cultural peculiarity of which has long 
been discussed (Davidson & McGrew, 2005). 
An extension of the PSD is represented by 
the use of one tool to manufacture another, evi-
dent already in the oldest known flaked stone 
tools of about 2.6 Ma (Semaw et al., 2003). The 
use of the hammerstone is not directly linked 
to butchering a carcass to gain food, but it is an 
effective element in the process of flaking with 
the products (flakes) used for different cutting 
tasks, for example, to dissect a carcass to feed 
on. The primary focus regarding a tool therefore 
shifts from applying it to a specific purpose to its 
general properties or functional options, such as 
‘cutting’ or ‘hammering’. Without the direct link 
of tool and final goal, tools can be used for sev-
eral purposes and their effects can be chained in 
different ways. Although the initial development 
of secondary tool use (Kitahara-Frisch, 1993) 
in hominins may likely have happened without 
the initiators realizing the consequent options, 
the modular affordances of decoupling of tools 
from specific purposes, and chaining effects in 
different forms and contexts, were increasingly 
exploited in the following millennia. 
Spontaneous secondary tool manufacture 
has thus far been observed only in a hominin 
context, although a  capacity for stone knapping 
(and thus secondary tool use) has been shown 
by bonobos once they were taught the tech-
nique by humans (Roffman et al., 2012; Toth 
& Schick, 2009). Whether the emergence of 
hominin behavioral novelty is based on cogni-
tive changes (Haidle, 2010, 2012), or is part of a 
gradual increase of cultural behavior “due to vari-
ation in sociability, and hence opportunities for 
social learning” (Pradhan et al., 2012, p. 180), 
is open to debate (Toth & Schick, 2009; Wynn 
et al., 2011). Associated with the occurrence of 
knapped stone tools, before and after 2 Ma, is 
the advanced exhaustion of cores (Delagnes & 
Roche, 2005), and a marked increase in transport 
distance of raw materials (Wynn et al., 2011). 
The extensive exhaustion of cores, with more 
than 70 flakes detached, indicates the production 
of cutting tools independent from an acute need, 
as does raw material transport over several kilom-
eters (Haidle, 2012, pp. 237-240). Both of these 
changes point to an increase in the decoupling 
of problem and solution in socially transmitted 
information. Evidence from the archaeological 
record surpasses basic culture’s relatively immedi-
ate response to problems, as observed in animal 
species today. Handaxes, the production of fire, 
or simple wooden spears, are literally unthink-
able without modular cultural capacity. The pro-
duction of the 300-ka-old throwing and thrust-
ing spears from Schöningen, Germany (Thieme, 
1997, 1999) required several tools with different 
qualities – tools that had to be produced using 
other tools (Haidle, 2009, 2010). The expan-
sion of modular behavior is associated with an 
extension of time depth between perception of 
a problem and its final solution. Hammerstones, 
raw materials, and specialized tools were not only 
procured when immediately needed, but were 
also transported over relatively long distances 
with a purpose in mind. As a consequence of the 
development of modular cultural capacities, free-
dom of action did not only broaden in a behavio-
ral sense, but also spatially and temporally. 
6 – Composite cultural capacity. This capacity 
is defined by the development and use of a set 
of cultural modules with specific qualities which 
are fused to form composites, with new qualities. 
The socially transmitted information exceeds that 
of modular cultural capacities through combin-
ing separate information on the basic elements 
of the composite “that may be obtained at dif-
ferent times and in different places” (Ambrose, 
2010, p. S139), with information on the newly 
created functional unit which may be assembled 
much later (ibid.). Hafted tools and compound 
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adhesives are typical material examples of such 
composites. This technological augmenta-
tion is seen as a critical cognitive development 
(ibid.; Barham 2013; Lombard & Haidle 2012; 
Wadley, 2010; Wynn et al., 2009), and we argue 
that it also represents an important expansion of 
cultural capacity. Composite tools and materi-
als expand cultural capacities by welding inde-
pendently existing ideas and solutions into new 
concepts. Hafting of stone tools, for example, 
combines the cutting qualities of a stone tool 
with qualities of the “handle”, (e.g. leverage, 
smooth grip, or the delivery system of a spear), 
and different fixing qualities of binding materi-
als and adhesives. The resulting product possesses 
new qualities that go beyond the qualities of the 
parts. A hafted knife can be used with more 
power than a bare blade, a spear with a bone or 
stone point penetrates the prey differently than 
a simple wooden one. In compound adhesives 
used in Southern Africa at least since 70 ka, the 
different components of resin, ochre powder, and 
potentially beeswax, each  with different proper-
ties, merge into a new and inseparable material 
with specific qualities – the adhesive (Wadley, 
2013; Wadley et al., 2009). Early evidence of 
composite cultural capacity reaches back at least 
200 ka: At the site 8-B-11 on the Sudanese Nile 
Island Sai, core axes show micro-wear traces of 
wooden hafts (Rots & Van Peer, 2006). At the 
nearly contemporaneous Campitello quarry near 
Bucine in Central Italy (Mazza et al., 2006), Late 
Acheulean stone tools were hafted in birch tar. 
Four pieces of fir wood from the Schöningen site, 
Germany, with cut notches at one or both ends 
and probably used as hafts for stone inserts, are 
thought to be more than 100 ka older (Thieme, 
1999). If the dates for stone points from Kathu 
Pan, South Africa, interpreted as having been 
hafted in spears, can be replicated, they would 
push evidence of composite cultural capacity 
back to around 500 ka (Wilkins et al., 2012). 
7 – Complementary cultural capacity. Here we 
see the development and use of a set of cul-
tural modules as an acting entity with two or 
more interdependent and exchangeable parts, 
like bow-and-arrow, needle-and-thread, screw-
and-screwdriver, key-and-lock etc. (Lombard 
& Haidle, 2012; Williams et al., 2014). Direct 
material evidence of complementary cultural 
capacities can be found in complementary tool 
sets of two or more elements which act with each 
other in a symbiotic way such as a bow on a vio-
lin. In part, the sets are composed of expendable 
elements like arrows and thread, which function 
in relation to respective enhancing/controlling 
elements like bows (for arrows) and needles (for 
thread). The symbiotic elements must be devel-
oped and used in complementary correspon-
dence with each other. The socially transmitted 
information thus expands. Not only does infor-
mation about the components involved have to 
be transmitted, but also key formal information 
about the whole system is required. Because 
the individual is not acting directly on the item 
which is finally affecting the goal (e.g., an arrow 
killing the prey, or a violin producing a melody), 
but on a controlling/enhancing element which 
operates the finally goal-effective element (bow 
operates arrow or violin), formal information 
about the comprehensive system is needed to 
understand how the different components can be 
used together. Additionally, formal information 
is required to exchange some components with 
formally similar ones (e.g., arrows formally fitting 
to a certain bow, but with different tips – blunt, 
composite with stone or bone points, poisoned 
etc.). Evidence of complementary cultural capac-
ity currently reaches back at least 64 ka in south-
ern Africa where some Howieson’s Poort backed 
tools were used to tip arrows (Lombard, 2011; 
Lombard & Phillipson, 2010; see Williams et 
al., 2014 for neuroarchaeological implications). 
Eyed needles have been known from the Upper 
Paleolithic in Europe, and the Caucasus region 
up to China (Bar-Yosef et al., 2011; Gasparyan et 
al., 2014; Huang et al., 1986). 
8 – Notional cultural capacity. This grade rep-
resents the last Paleolithic expansion of cultural 
capacities that can be detected on the basis of 
an extension of the PSD. It is characterized by 
the development of notional concepts as cultural 
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modules. Notional concepts are mentally con-
structed and socially shared entities and relation-
ships that can be represented in a) the significa-
tion of objects/signs (e.g. cross, crescent, and Star 
of David as symbols of religions), b) systems of 
ideas (e.g. myths, religious beliefs, philosophi-
cal questions, constitutions of states), c) norma-
tive definitions (e.g. metric and value systems), 
or d) virtual beings (e.g. angels) and characters 
(e.g.protecting capacities of an amulet). The 
socially transmitted information exceeds that 
of all former capacities. It is now based on non-
physical concepts, which can be manipulated 
only in the mind or through imagination, and 
their effects on real or other notional modules. 
Notional concepts can stand alone without an 
immediate link to a physical object, acting as 
independent operational foci such as ideas about 
‘justice’, ‘reincarnation’, or the ‘devil’.  They can, 
however, also be combined with a physical object 
to form a composite with new functional quali-
ties emerging out of the basic physical qualities 
and a certain meaning (e.g., a specific natural 
monument like a rock or a huge tree to be com-
bined with a certain signification to form a sanc-
tuary). Material evidence of notional cultural 
capacity and the possibility of preservation is 
bound to such composite artefacts. 
Different from purely physical modules, 
notional modules unfold their main potential 
only in social use (cf. Porr, 2010; Schebesch, 
2013). While even a complex bow-and-arrow 
set can be used individually without losing 
any major effect, the full potential of symbols, 
norms, and systems of ideas is bound to sharing 
within a group. Notional tools serve as devices 
for the communication of set, pre-determined or 
agreed-upon concepts. The composites of physi-
cal objects and notions are information carriers 
– artifacts such as balancing weights, cuneiform 
inscriptions or, in recent times, a banknote, a 
wedding ring or a token which gain their proper 
function only in association with exclusively 
virtual elements. Notional cultural capacity can 
increase the individual scope of competences, for 
example by using notational marks as mnemonic 
device (yet not every use of marks as mnemonic 
device is necessarily notional). However, notional 
cultural capacity becomes increasingly visible 
and powerful when the notional elements are 
not only socially transmitted, but are also socially 
applied within a complementary group. A piece 
of art remains bare ornamental craftsmanship 
when there is no further meaning linked to it, 
but its stimulating power is enhanced when its 
meaning is understood by other individuals. 
Money is worthless without a shared concept 
of value, and writing not based on a socially 
accepted symbolic system remains scrawl. 
Due to the virtual nature of notional modules 
it is often difficult to detect undoubted evidence 
of notional cultural capacity within the archaeo-
logical record. Pigments and cut marks on dif-
ferent raw materials are often claimed to impli-
cate symbolic content (d’Errico & Henshilwood, 
2011; d’Errico et al., 2012; Mania & Mania, 
1988), a fact which can hardly be proven with-
out other unambiguous hints from the archaeo-
logical context (cf. Garofoli & Haidle, 2014). 
Recently, ca. 500 ka old shells from Trinil on Java, 
Indonesia have been reported as showing engrav-
ings in a geometrical pattern (Joordens et al., 
2014). However, it is not clear that the engrav-
ings are deliberate, let alone evidence of Homo 
erectus having attempted to signify something. 
Eagle claws from 130 ka old layers at Krapina 
suggest at least a Neandertal affection for special 
objects (Radovčić et al., 2015); if possible orna-
ments as such are a proof of symbolism is debated 
(Garofoli, 2014). It is only around 40 ka ago that 
undisputable elements of figurative art occur in 
the archaeological record, which are accepted 
by most archaeologists as carriers of notional 
information (but see Malafouris, 2007 for an 
alternative conception of cave paintings). From 
that time, ivory sculptures depicting animals and 
females have been discovered from several cave 
sites of the Swabian Jura in Southern Germany 
(Conard, 2003, 2009; Higham et al., 2012). 
As early evidence of notional concepts artistic 
representations of probably supernatural beings 
are counted like the ca 40 ka lion-man from 
the Hohlestein-Stadel cave in South Germany 
(cf. Kind et al., 2014; Wynn et al., 2009), the 
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‘adorant’ from the Geißenklösterle cave nearby 
(Hahn, 1994), and the small figurine interpreted 
as a lion-man from Hohle Fels cave (Conard, 
2003). A stone figurine from Stratzing in Austria 
(Neugebauer-Maresch, 1989), paintings on rock 
fragments from Fumane Cave in Northern Italy 
(Broglio et al., 2005), and the paintings from 
Grotte Chauvet in France (Clottes, 2001) are of 
roughly comparable age. The oldest cave paint-
ings, so far, have been dated in Northern Spain 
back to more than 40.8 ka (Pike et al., 2012). 
Outside Europe, the oldest evidence for figura-
tive depictions was found in the Maros caves on 
Sulawesi, Indonesia dating back to more than 35 
ka (Aubert et al., 2014) and in 27.5 ka old layers 
at Apollo 11 Cave in Namibia (Vogelsang, 1998). 
Conclusions
The development of cultural capacities can 
be studied on a variety of levels. We propose 
three dimensions of development – evolution-
ary-biological, historical-social, and ontogenetic-
individual – that create the scaffold within which 
multiple factors form cultural performances. 
Each of the factors developed on its own path in 
interdependence with other factors, and within 
the context of ever-changing specific environ-
ments/ecological niches. Such an integrated 
concept of cultural performances and their evo-
lution, as presented in this paper, offers a com-
bination of aspects and concepts dealing with 
evolution. More specifically it encompasses: 
notions of  cultural evolution such as the dual-
inheritance theory (Richerson & Boyd, 1978) 
that raised attention on cultural developmental 
processes beyond genetics and on gene-culture 
coevolution (see also Aoki, 2001; Feldman & 
Laland, 1996); the comparison of biological and 
cultural transmission of traits (Cavalli-Sforza & 
Feldman, 1981); the emphasis put on the evolu-
tion of psychological mechanisms (as factors of 
the evolutionary-biological dimension), and the 
population dynamics of cultural systems (as fac-
tors of the historical-social dimension) (Henrich 
& McElreath, 2003); epigenetic processes as part 
of an ontogenetic-individual dimension in evolu-
tion (Jablonka & Lamb, 2007); the developmen-
tal interrelation between cultural performances 
and neurobiological and psychological processes 
(Kim & Sasaki, 2014); or the interaction of envi-
ronmental factors and cultural performances in 
the construction of niches/specific functional 
environments (Kendal et al., 2011; Laland & 
O’Brien, 2011). The emphasis of the EECC 
model for cultural performances lies in the inte-
gration of an increasingly comprehensive, cross-
disciplinary set of factors and processes affecting 
the development of cultural performances. Such 
an integrated approach gives special attention 
to interdependencies of factors and processes 
within and between the three developmental 
dimensions and the specific functional environ-
ment (resource space, ecological niche). 
We also attempted to interconnect models 
and data on cultural basics in animal behav-
ior with developments in hominin behavior, as 
deduced from archaeological remains, in order 
to create a scaffold to which observations on 
specific factors and the development of (sets of ) 
single performances can be fixed. There is not 
a single cultural capacity representing a “set of 
genetically based cognitive abilities that, collec-
tively, make human culture possible” (Lind et al., 
2013, p. 1), but several grades of cultural capac-
ity expansion in non-human animals and homi-
nins (Tab. 1). The grades of cultural capacity 
evolution in the EECC model presented above 
have been identified on the basis of expansions 
in the PSD observable in tool behavior. There 
might be other possible classifications of cultural 
development, but the later grades defined within 
our model can be detected in the archaeologi-
cal record and can be combined with ethological 
data. It is assumed that each grade is accompa-
nied by an expansion in the evolutionary-biolog-
ical dimension such as gene expressions in the 
brain, the biological basis of natural pedagogy, 
or the different physical and mental properties 
necessary to perceive and produce language, 
completed by historical-social extensions. Due 
to the enormous number of factors involved in 
the three developmental dimensions, and the 
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specific functional environment with its own 
developmental paths, due to the multiple inter-
dependencies between these factors, and due to 
the varying combinations of factors in different 
performances, the identified grades of the evolu-
tion and/or expansion of cultural capacities can 
only be analytic approximations, as opposed to 
being selective categories. The emergence of a 
new qualitative grade of cultural capacity does 
not replace all the preceding or plesiomorphic 
grades (as presented in our model, not neces-
sarily in time), but is integrated with them, 
creating a completely new cultural system of 
relationships. Importantly, cultural performances 
in each of the grades do not stop evolving. Thus, 
it is possible, for example, that archaic hominin 
groups who never developed, say, notional cul-
ture could have reached cultural performances in 
one or more of the other grades of cultural capac-
ity that go beyond those found in groups exhibit-
ing notional culture. The more inclusive grades 
of cultural capacity are not necessarily “better” 
than those with seemingly less complexity. They 
could have increased Darwinian fitness only in 
relation to contingent situations. If the condi-
tions change, it is perfectly possible that notional 
Tab. 1 - Summary of the eight grades of expansion of cultural capacity identified on the basis of the 
extension of the problem-solution distance.
CULTURAL 
CAPACITY
TYPE OF SOCIALLY TRANSMITTED 
INFORMATION
PROBLEM-
SOLUTION 
DISTANCE ON 
CULTURAL LEVEL
MATERIAL 
EXPRESSION - 
EMPIRICAL
1 Socially 
facilitated 
information
Immediate response to social stimulus A → B
2 Social learning Durable response to social stimulus A → B
3 Tradition Durable transgenerational transmission 
of single independent behavioral units 
(stimulus, rough concept of solution, goal) 
A → B (simple tools)
4 Basic Durable transgenerational transmission 
of sets of independent behavioral units 
(specific stimuli, rough concepts of solutions, 
specific goals)
A → B (simple tools)
5 Modular Durable transgenerational transmission of 
sets of independent cultural units which 
can be used as modules and combined in 
different ways in an effective sequence
A → B → C secondary tools (tools to 
make tools)
6 Composite Durable transgenerational transmission 
of sets of cultural modules which can be 
fused to form composites with new 
qualities
A
    → C
B
composite tools (e.g. 
spear with hafted tip, 
compound adhesive) 
7 Complementary Durable transgenerational transmission 
of sets of cultural modules as acting 
entity with interdependent parts 
(complementary set) 
A
   } → C
B
complementary tools 
(e.g. bow-and arrow, 
needle-and-thread, 
ornamental systems) 
8 Notional  Durable transgenerational transmission of 
notional concepts as cultural modules
A
    }→ C
B
Notional tools (e.g. 
figurative art)
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cultural performances become detrimental for 
human survival. Increase in complexity of behav-
ioral network is not “better” in absolute terms. It 
is simply more complex.
In general, the cultural performances do not 
exhaust the potential capacities. It is, however, a 
characteristic of cultural behavior that individu-
als can socially learn, or be taught, parts of the 
cultural system or its operation without fully 
understanding the concept/s on which it is based. 
The individual performances based on specific 
cultural capacities can be enormously variable. It 
could range from limited use of some expressions 
of a concept to the full understanding thereof, 
and of the potential of possible derivatives. Due 
to this cultural effect, chimpanzees and bonobos 
can learn (from modern humans) how to com-
municate using symbol charts, but they have not 
been able to develop such a symbolic system on 
their own. Although they are able to adopt free-
hand, stone-to-stone percussion to create useful 
flakes for cutting to gain access to food resources 
(Whiten et al., 2009), neither chimpanzees nor 
bonobos have yet been observed to show per-
formances based on modular cultural capacities 
without human contact.  
To facilitate the integration of newly identi-
fied developmental factors and the inclusion of 
new observational data and archaeological finds, 
the EECC model has been created as an open 
model. No hominin species or periods are fixed to 
the grades of expansion. The examples provided 
reflect the current state of knowledge respectively, 
mainly accepted opinion, but the linkage to a spe-
cies or time frame is floating, pending (new) finds 
and observations. Table 2 provides a sketch of the 
grades of evolution/expansion of cultural capaci-
ties in hominins with current information about 
the bearers and datings. These general grades 
of evolution in cultural capacity are associated 
with expansions of various specific features and 
abilities including the alteration and expansion 
of the specific functional environment/ecological 
niches, technological skill, planning depth, antici-
pation, problem perception, and different forms 
of play (Nowell, in press). Changes in life history, 
like the extension of childhood (Bock & Sellen, 
2002) and of the post-fertile phase (Bogin, 2009; 
O’Connell et al., 1999), and consequent changes 
in social organization led to larger social groups, 
loose mother-offspring ties, increased pro-social-
ity among juveniles, and greater opportunities for 
social learning. Demographic parameters includ-
ing population size, and the rate and scale of 
interactions, are important for the development 
of cultural capacity in general, and especially for 
new forms of collective action (Powell et al., 2009; 
Shennan, 2001; but see also Read [2012], Collard 
et al. [2013], and French [2015] for limitations of 
the demographic model). They affect innovation 
Tab. 2 - Grades of expansion of cultural capacities in hominins. 
CULTURAL 
CAPACITY 
ARTIFACT 
MARKERS 
EARLIEST EVIDENCE 
CURRENTLY WIDELY 
ACCEPTED
CURRENTLY ASSOCIATED SPECIES 
4 Basic basic tools (> 2.6 Ma) Chimpanzees, orangutans, bonobos, whales 
and dolphins, New Caledonian crows 
5 Modular modular tools < 2.6 Ma early Homo + H. erectus 
6 Composite composite tools < 300 ka H. sapiens + late archaics
7 Complementary complementary 
tools
< 100 ka H. sapiens 
8 Notional notional tools < 40 ka H. sapiens 
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rates as well as the rates of extinction of cultural 
items. Which of the different factors and processes 
gained in importance in which grade, how they 
influenced each other, and how developments 
in the evolutionary-biological, the historical-
social, and the ontogenetic-individual dimension 
and the specific functional environment specifi-
cally interacted in certain cultural performances, 
remains to be studied in detail. Further research 
is also necessary to clarify for each developmental 
grade the different forms and processes of trans-
mission of information, and the set of problems 
that can be approached by the grade-specific form 
of socially transmitted information. The integra-
tive concept of cultural performances respectively, 
capacities with three developmental dimensions 
embedded in the specific functional environment 
and the EECC model, based on the extension of 
the type of socially transmitted information, is 
simply an inclusive frame that now can be fleshed 
out with further data and details.
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